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1 Introduction
The diverse and interdisciplinary approaches gathered in Kris Rutten, Stefaan Blancke, and
Ronald Soetaert’s edited volume Perspectives on Science and Culture calmly and measuredly
investigate the continuities and discontinuities between scientific understanding and cultural
representation. The book thus constitutes a welcome addition to an academic terrain that has
been occupied by positions as diverse as—in the disparaging characterization by the respective
detractors—Bcrypto-positivism^ or Bscientism^ (ranging over empiricism, naturalism, scien-
tific realism, and rationalism), and the Bpolitically correct^ Bacademic left^ (comprising
postmodernism, poststructuralism, constructionism, radical sociology, and the like), a terrain
that has, unsurprisingly, been marked by vociferous disputation and substantial acrimony. The
book provides fresh insights into the so-called Bscience wars,^ exploring the tensions between
what C.P. Snow has referred to as the Btwo cultures,^ i.e., the sciences and the humanities, and
also engaging with Jerome Bruner’s account of logical-scientific versus narrative modes of
thinking. In what follows, I examine the different perspectives—rhetorical, narrative, cogni-
tive, and epistemological—especially in relation to the educational dimensions and implica-
tions, the socially/culturally aware teaching, and learning of science.
2 Rhetorical and Narrative Perspectives
The chapters collected in this section demonstrate how science develops and how science
education takes place on the basis of rhetorical (or persuasive) and narrative devices. Scientists
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and science teachers work within a discursive community. They communicate their knowl-
edge, publicize their findings, articulate their doubts and concerns, argue with one another, and
seek to convince others of the correctness of their beliefs. Of course, those dabbling in
pseudoscience also operate in discursive spaces. They too seek to publicize their beliefs and
persuade others to accept them. The crucial difference, however, is that in doing so, they
generally tend to present content in a way that violates the criteria for inquiry, for example, by
suppressing critical evaluation of reasons and evidence; use a pedagogical method that is
inconsistent with the requirements of the general nature of enquiry and moral principles; and
want the recipients (e.g., learners) to form certain unshakeable beliefs, even in the face of
contrary evidence. The function of discourse in science and science education, however, is
arguably different. Guided by evidence and by both truthfulness and a quest for truth,
rhetorical and narrative devices play an important part in rational persuasion, and this
underlines their educational and pedagogical value.
Among the chapters collected in Part 1 of the book is David Tietge’s account of the
anthropocentric representation of nature on cable television, which generally aims for
Bedutainment,^ i.e., education through or by means of entertainment. A related aspect, the
educational function of popular science and the kind of rhetoric at work here, is discussed in
Alan Gross’ chapter. Richard van Oort tackles the traditional Bconflict^ between the sciences
and the humanities by focusing on an aspect central to both the question of human origin (this
is also the subject of Peter Kjærgaard’s contribution) and specifically, the origin of human
language. Ronald Soetaert and Kris Rutten deal with the debate between and about the Btwo
cultures^ by way of an analysis of how fiction may be used to problematize and thematize the
confrontation between science and art.
3 Cognitive Perspectives
Part 2 essentially deals with how the cognitive sciences yield findings and insights that contribute
to our understanding and appreciation of science. Contrary to what some philosophers (notably
John Locke) have thought, the human mind is not a tabula rasa but is, rather, equipped with
Bintuitive expectations^ concerning significant parts and aspects of our Umwelt. These intuitions
are educationally relevant for two reasons. They often constitute cognitive obstacles that science,
scientists, and science teachers need to overcome. After all, scientific concepts and theories are
often highly counterintuitive. The challenge, therefore, is to devise tools and methods for
achieving this. However, if these intuitions are addressed appropriately (and this is arguably
where some of the rhetorical and narrative devices at work in education, as discussed in part 1,
come into play), they can be put to use as scaffolding for learners’ scientific grasp of the world.
The chapters collected in this section all deal with the various roles played by intuition in the
development, transmission, and understanding of science and scientific knowledge.
Elisa Järnefelt confronts persistent intuitions that have also characterized, for worse rather
than better, the attitudes and positions of a veritable slew of U.S. presidents and other
influential politicians—namely about evolutionary theory and anthropogenic climate change.
Especially useful for science educators are Järnefelt’s recommendations for dealing with these
and similar prejudices in a classroom context. On the subject of intuitions about evolution,
Margaret Evans’s chapter, too, offers suggestions for employing core intuitions not as hin-
drances to biological reasoning but as promoting or, to use Evans’s term, Bjump-starting^
science learning. A third contribution dealing with competing ideas about evolution is
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Dominique Guillo’s analysis of different representations of the origin of species in secular
(French) and religious (Moroccan) contexts. He argues that there are no sharp boundaries
between adherence to evolution, on the one hand, and creationism on the other. He takes the
Bfuzziness^ of people’s beliefs as providing grounds for problematizing the distinction be-
tween Btheory^ and Bintuition,^ arguing that working creatively and constructively with the
uncertainty that marks people’s interactions may be Bcrucial to ensure an effective dissemina-
tion of evolutionary theory, especially in education.^
4 Epistemological Perspectives
The generation and sustenance of knowledge, including scientific knowledge, is a central
preoccupation of classical epistemology. Not only are we individual human beings biologically
limited, in terms of our lifespan and our reasoning and experiential abilities, but we are also
circumscribed in terms of our historical and geographical location. It follows that we would do
well, not least for epistemic reasons, to rely on other people’s expertise and testimony,
competence, and truthfulness, and of course on constructive criticisms by peers. It is in this
sense that social epistemology, understood here as being concerned with the interpersonal and
social practices and norms that influence and guide the quest for knowledge and truth, has
gained significance and widespread acceptance in recent years.
Christophe Heintz examines the argument that the evolution of science constitutes a
specific case of cultural evolution. In doing so, he is critical of the assumption that the
evolution of science proceeds through blind variation and selective retention. This assumption,
he contends, is at odds with a substantial amount of what is known about both the history of
science and scientific cognition. Instead of blind variation and selective retention, Heintz
argues that it is Bcultural attraction^ that enables the stabilization of cultural phenomena: BTo
understand cultural attraction, one needs to discover the constructive processes that generate
new ideas and their interpretations by the scientific community.^ In their contribution, Stefaan
Blancke, Koen Tanghe, and Johan Braeckman revisit the dual role of intuition in science and in
the ways that science is communicated, taught, and learnt. On the one hand, science has an
intuitive, cognitive foundation. On the other hand, it frequently yields counterintuitive results.
This tension, the authors argue, constitutes both a challenge and an opportunity for everyone
involved in the dissemination and facilitation of scientific knowledge and concepts. Science
educators, for example, are tasked with appealing to people’s intuitive understanding through
the development of educational tools, practices, and strategies, like engaging imagery, meta-
phors, and narratives. However, these educational, communicational, and rhetorical tools,
methods, and strategies can also prove counterproductive, especially if and when the pertinent
scientific concepts, theories, and results are counterintuitive. The authors conclude with some
general, illustrative remarks about how teachers should proceed, and what Beducational tools
and strategies they can deploy to develop a scientific understanding of the world in their
students or audience^ and, at the same time, Bavoid the pitfalls of intuitive reasoning.^ In the
final chapter of the book, Maarten Boudry and Massimo Pigliucci dismiss any suggestion of a
stark opposition between the social and the rational. They contend that science, contrary to the
classical view, is an inescapably social enterprise, practiced by real persons in real social and
cultural contexts. This does not mean, however, that reason and rationality must take a
backseat. Reference to both social and rational factors that underlie the development of beliefs
about the world is required to account for the epistemic credentials of science.
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5 Concluding Comments
A widespread, popular view is that ethnic or cultural groups have their own distinctive
epistemologies that epistemologies are also gendered and that these have been largely ignored
by the dominant social group. A corollary of this view states that scientific research is pursued
within a framework that represents particular assumptions about knowledge and knowledge
production that reflect the interests and historical traditions of this dominant group. More often
than not, however, in such arguments for different, diverse, alternative, decolonized, or
demasculinized epistemologies, some relevant philosophical issues remain unresolved, if not
unaddressed altogether. What exactly do claims about epistemological diversity mean? Do
these ways of establishing knowledge, including scientific knowledge, stand up to critical
interrogation? Moreover, how do they relate to classical epistemological distinctions, e.g.,
between knowledge and belief and between descriptive and normative inquiry, and to episte-
mologically essential components like justification and truth?
Given the bad press that science, scientific knowledge, and scientific truth have had in
recent decades, following not only the concerted attacks of some postmodernists,
poststructuralists, constructivists, and certain feminist theorists but also the gung-ho advocacy
by academic conservatives, this book constitutes a fresh approach, a much-needed balanced
appraisal of both the significance of culture and the translatability of science. The essays
collected in this timely volume eschew both the epistemological and cultural relativism and the
all-out universalism associated with their respective warring fronts.
What is arguably missing in this otherwise comprehensive and balanced collection of
essays is a discussion of the Bintuitive ontologies^ underlying ethnoscience and indigenous
knowledge (systems), the intuitions governing invocation of, for example, ethnobotany,
indigenous medical and veterinary knowledge, African metallurgy, Dogon and Palikur astron-
omy, Native American archeology, and Aboriginal navigation techniques. Whatever one’s take
on these notions and phenomena (and mine tends to be a fairly critical one), they deserve to be
acknowledged and taken seriously. The editors do refer to folk physics, folk biology, and folk
psychology in their introduction, but these references remain scant and, in the body of the
volume, somewhat insubstantial.
Having said this, it must be noted that this is really a fairly minor quibble. Rutten, Blancke,
and Soetaert have produced an eminently readable and engaging book, a timely collection of
essays that will be of great interest and benefit not only to theorists of science, science
education, and comparative cultural studies, but also to graduate students, and to science
educators working in multicultural and intercultural environments.
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